II

The defendants or respondents next postulate, in their OPPOSITION dated January 2,
2001 that the plaintiffs or petitioners " have no personality to sue" even
as taxpayers because "the Semirara Landfill Project does not involve the
exercise by Congress of its taxing and spending powers", and that "a
taxpayer's suit may be sustained only when the act complained of directly involves
an illegal disbursement of public funds raised by taxation", but that all they
say is that they "are entitled to the full benefit of living in a balanced and
healthy environment free from any form of environmental hazards caused by man,"
which is a general averment "grossly insufficient to clothe petitioners with
standing." This Court cannot subscribe to the foregoing.

For one reason or another, the defendants or respondents  have omitted to state that
in paragraph one (1) of the COMPLAINT dated December 21, 2000, the plaintiffs or
petitioners expressly aver that "this is a taxpayer's suit because the acts of
the defendants sought to be enjoined in this case would involve expenditure of public
funds in bringing garbage from Metro Manila to Semirara Island, Caluya, Antique".
This averment, considered with the plaintiffs' or petitioners' other allegations that
the defendants' or respondents' acts complained of is violative of the right of the
former to a balanced and healthful ecology, ineluctably compels this Court to hold
that the plaintiffs or the petitioners have satisfactorily alleged facts which show
that they have sufficient interest as to have legal standing before this Court to seek
an injunctive remedy against the impairment of their right to a sound environment.
Indeed, a taxpayer can bring an action to restrain an unlawful disbursement of public
funds (Galarosa vs. Valencia, 227 SCRA 728) which, in the present case, would come in
the consequent payment by the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and/or the
Greater Metro Manila Waste Management Committee for the dumping in Semirara Island,
Caluya, Antique of garbage coming from Metro Manila, which the defendants or
respondents so vehemently insisted during the summary hearing on January 2,
2001 as either a national government infrastructure project or a service contract.
It need not be overemphasized that the prosecution or implementation of a national
government infrastructure project or service contract necessarily entails the
disbursement of public funds, and is a matter which is of public knowledge or is
capable of unquestionable demonstration and of which this Court takes judicial
notice.

It is worth recalling the aforecited case of  Oposa vs, Factoran, Jr. where the
"complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' suit" (224 SCRA 792,796) and,
as already underscored earlier, where the allegations of facts are similar, if not
identical, to those averred in the present case. In the said case, it was held that
the plaintiffs or petitioners --- minors, at that --- "can, for themselves,
for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class
suit. Their personality to sue… can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
" So was it in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., so must it be in the present case,
  that is, that the herein plaintiffs or petitioners have locus standi.


III


In their OPPOSITION dated January 2, 2001, the defendants or respondents likewise
posit that the plaintiffs or petitioners have not sufficiently alleged grave and
irreparable injury, because the complaint sets forth nothing but general allegations
of the injury caused or to be caused by the acts of the defendants or respondents
which are, therefore, insufficient to justify the issuance of a restraining order
or injunctive writ. They then argue that "(P)etitioners may not leave their
proofs in such shape that a reasonable doubt remains, for as has so often been
said, to doubt is to deny." This stance of the defendants or respondents
is unpersuasive.

This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that there are only two requisites for
an injunctive writ to issue: (1) the existence of a right in esse of the
petitioner or plaintiff which must be protected; and (2) the act complained of is
a violation of such right (Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Association,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 200). Gauged against the foregoing requisites,
it is well to note the plaintiffs' or petitioners' allegations in the COMPLAINT
dated December 21, 2000, and more pertinently those substantially quoting Section 3,
Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:

"(a) that the plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs demanded and the whole
or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of
the act/acts complained of either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) that the commission of the act/acts complained of during the litigation would
work injustice to the plaintiffs considering the far reaching effects of the
pollution of the environment in the area where the garbage is proposed to be dumped;

(c) that the defendants collectively or any of the defendants individually are foing
(sic), threatening or are attempting to do or are procuring or suffering to be done
some act/acts in the violation of the rights of the plaintiffs respecting the subject
of the action which is to prevent them from dumping garbage from Metro Manila to
Semirara Island, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual." (Ibid.
Underscoring supplied).

This Court cannot quite see how the plaintiffs' or petitioners' material
allegations and, with specificity, that about "the far-reaching effects of the
pollution of the environment" as may result from the dumping in Semirara
Island, Caluya, Antique of garbage coming from Metro Manila can be categorized
as "general averments" by the defendants or respondents. Quite contrarily,
the same allegations convey to this Court the import of grave and irreparable
injury that may be occasioned to the plaintiffs or petitioners if the act complained
of were not in the meantime restrained. Such allegations, which are verified, by
themselves, engender reasonable and sufficient bases under the rules for this Court
to temporarily restrain the threatened dumping of garbage without need for the
plaintiffs or petitioners to show evidence of such alleged facts at this stage
of the proceeding (Sec. 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure). As a matter
of fact, even in the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction --- a
stage that ensues after the issuance of a temporary restraining order has been dealt
with --- the Court considers nothing more than initial or incomplete evidence, and
makes findings which are merely interlocutory (La Vista Association, Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals, 278 SCRA 498). Thus, at this point, the defendants' or respondents'
argument that "(P)etitioners may not leave their proofs in such shape that a
reasonable doubt remains, for as has so often been said, to doubt is to deny",
is utterly misplaced.



IV

The conclusions arrived at by this Court are subserved by the uncontroverted fact,
admitted by the defendants or respondents through Atty. Manuel Gaite, that no
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) has been issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for the waste management project which
involves the environment. There is thus an apparent obliviousness on the part of
the defendants or respondents to even priorly procure what is fundamentally required
(Executive Order No. 192 dated June 10, 1987; DENR Administrative Order No. 96-37)
for such an undertaking which would have transcendental effects on the right to a
sound environment which belongs not only to the plaintiffs or petitioners but also
to their children and children's children.

It matters not that the Sangguniang Barangay of Semirara has passed a resolution
(Exh. "1") supporting the waste management project, for it cannot be
gainsaid that, on the other hand, the Sangguniang Bayan of Caluya, Antique and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Antique separately passed resolutions (Annexes "E"
and "L", COMPLAINT dated December 21, 2000) in strong opposition to the
same project. This explains why, as conceded by Atty. Manuel Gaite, no Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) has been obtained for the project, because under applicable
rules and regulations (DENR Administrative Order No. 96-37; Executive Order No.
192 dated June 10, 1987) a scoping or series of meetings, which must be documented,
are indispensable steps to the issuance of such certificate, so  that the local
government units concerned must expressly give imprimatur to such kind of project
in which every kindred soul has a stake. This is specially so that under Executive
Order No. 542 dated June 26, 1979, as amended, Caluya, Antique has been declared and
established as a Marine Turtle Sanctuary and, thereby, withdrawn from exploitation
(See also MNR Administrative Order No. 34 dated June 21, 1982; MNR Administrative
Order No. 08, dated June 8, 1982) and, by the same token, Caluya, Antique is an
environmentally critical area (DENR Administrative Order No. 96-37). This means,
emphatically, that Caluya, Antique is ecologically, socially or geologically sensitive
from the legal and other viewpoints.

The lack of urgency which Atty. Cornelio Aldon underscored is a matter of his own
perception which he obviously ties up with his disclosure that the contract for
sanitary landfill between MMDA and DMCI and R-II BUILDERS has passed the final stage
of negotiations, thereby implying that no contract has as yet been perfected. This
disclosure, made in open court during the summary hearing on January 2, 2001, suffers
from inadequate candidness because in the OPPOSITION dated January 2, 2001 of the
public respondents or defendants it is categorically represented that "petitioners
are suing to prevent the enforcement of obligations under a contract that has been
entered into between the government and respondents DMCI, Celdex/ R-II Builders
Consortium" (Ibid.P.5.Underscoring supplied). This is not to say that one or
the other defendants or respondents are before this Court with unclean hands as to
a germane fact for, it that were so, none of their words deserves to be listened to.

But, whether the waste management contract between MMDA and DMCI and R-II BUILDERS
has only passed the final stage of negotiations, or it has in fact been perfected,
is really beside the point. One or the other evinces a certainty that, at any moment,
what the plaintiffs or petitioners dread --- the dumping in Semirara Island, Caluya,
Antique of garbage coming from Metro Manila, and the specter of havoc to the 
ecologically, socially or geologically sensitive environment of Caluya, Antique
it can bring about --- would come to pass.

Time ought to be a benefactor, not a stealthy foe, to the herein plaintiffs or
petitioners. And as they have come before this Court for relief while yet there
is such time, and before the act complained of has been commenced by the defendants
or respondents, this Court is constrained to accord the plaintiffs or petitioners
that relief, here and now. Afterall, it is beyond debate that what can be restrained
only is an act which has not yet been done (Rivera vs. Florendo, 144 SCRA 658). And,
moreover, such a course of action by this Court results to nothing else than the
preservation of the status quo, the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation
which preceded the present action (Versoza vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 100), until
the case can be heard on the merits.

A word more. While this order is dictated by circumstances of the present, it looks to
the future. The natural resources of Semirara Island, Caluya, Antique, nay, of the
entire country and the whole world, are gifts from the Divine Architect. It is a bounden
duty for the people to cherish and to protect these natural resources now and in the
years ahead. This Court can do no less.Otherwise, the day will arrive when from our
nerveless grasps shall drop forever the boundless bounties of these  that sustain life.
By then there would be no garbage to speak of, nor a dumpsite to quarrel about, as
everyone would have come to the end of their toilsome and earthly journey.

So mote it be!

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, until such time that the plaintiffs'
or petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary injunction can be heard, the
defendants or respondents HON. ANTONIO CERILES, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, SEC. ROBERT AVENTAJADO,
DMCI/CELDEX/R-II BUILDERS, and/or DAVID M. CONSUNJI, and all other persons acting in their
behalf, direction or authority, are temporarily restrained for an extended period not
exceeding twenty (20) days including the original seventy-two (72) hours subject of the
ORDER dated December 29, 2000, or until January 18, 2001, from dumping garbage coming from
Metro Manila into or at Unong Pit or any other area at Semirara Island, Caluya, Antique.

Furnish copies of this order to the Solicitor General, and to Attorneys Manuel Gaite, C
ornelio Aldon, Violeta Seva, Roel Pacio, Jerome Canlas, and Robin Rubinos.

SO ORDERED.

San Jose, Antique, Philippines, January 3, 2001.